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Abstract 
We define misleadership as leadership process involving a complex interplay of leader, follower, and 
situational elements, inscribing a vicious circle of intensifying dysfunctional action. It is tempting to 
see misleadership as the result of the madness of one leader. It is also misleading. Leadership 
research has been insufficiently attentive to misleadership and, in particularly, to the one of the most 
extreme forms of misleadership factors interveningresulting in genocidal processes. We discuss the 
antecedents and the rule of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in the 1970s as an extreme case of 
misleadership. We seek to derive some lessons from the Polpotist dystopia as well as reflect on 
possible contra-strategies. In particular, we suggest that it is necessary to distinguish measures for 
social change that are admissible and positive, from negative utopian visions that are negative, 
inadmissible and facilitative of evil leadership.     
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THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF GENOCIDAL LEADERSHIP: 
POL POT AND A CAMBODIAN DYSTOPIA  
Leadership, as largely portrayed in the organization and management literatures, is represented as a 
fundamentally positive process. Gini and Green (2012), however, observe that leadership sometimes 
unfolds in such a way that it ends up being best described as “misleadership”, as something that it 
would be misleading to term “leadership”. A similar perspective is assumed by Perruci and 
McManus (2013, p. 50) when stating that “immoral – evil – goals, by definition do not fall under the 
leadership category.” Some researchers distinguish possible types of destructive leadership behavior. 
Aasland, Skogstad, Notelaers, Nielsen, and Einarsen (2010), for example, concluded that leadership 
behavior that is destructive rather than constructive is a prevalent phenomenon rather than an 
anomaly, with tyrannical leadership being the rarest form of destructive behavior (distinguishing 
different types of “destructive leadership” in Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007). The fact that 
democratic governing structures now prevail in the West (Brill & Sloan, 2011) should not obscure 
the fact that non-democratic forms of leadership and governance are still common elsewhere, 
sometimes producing extreme results.         
 The article considers one specific type of tyrannical leadership based upon the use of 
genocidal terror as a tool of power by discussing the conditions that favored the emergence of 
genocidal leadership in Cambodia in the 1970s and through analysis of the underlying rationality of 
genocide in the case of Pol Pot and “Pol Potism” (1975-1979; the Appendix summarizes some key 
chronological moments of Pol Pot and Pol Potism). Rithy Panh, the Cambodian filmmaker who 
witnessed the Khmer Rouge years, characterized Pol Pot as a case of genocidal leadership of a 
regime defined by violence and purity (see Gini & Green 2012). The statistics are stark. Short (2004) 
suggests that 1.7 million people died as a consequence of the policies imposed between 1975 and the 
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beginning of 1979 by the Khmer Rouge, people who were victims of execution, starvation, and 
extreme exhaustion. Such a case represented far more than an example of bad leadership: at an 
institutional level, it was extremely destructive normalized social practice. Using genocide as a 
power tool (Cunha, Clegg, Rego, & Gabriel, 2014) and normalizing it in a society may be an 
extreme, but it is not unusual. Genocide is not a rare event: since Kampuchea there have been many 
cases, the most recent being the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS; “poor in 
offering a lifestyle that most people find attractive” (…) but “strong in spiritual purity”; Brooks, 
2014) waging genocide on non-Sunni believers.  
The persistence of institutionalized genocidal processes and evil leaders justifies research on a 
topic that is prevalent and tragic from a human perspective (Goldhagen, 2009). Genocide (“a crime 
with the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group”; 
Volhardt & Bilewicz, 2013, p. 1), is a highly organized process, knowledge of which is necessary to 
understand why people organize themselves around evil, inhuman visions and follow malign leaders 
(Owens, Su, & Snow, 2013). Processes involving categorizations that divide people into the worthy 
and the unworthy on the basis of some marker, usually premised on some permutation of ethnic, 
linguistic or religious identity, are at the core of genocidal programs. The killings in Kampuchea 
resulted from categorical distinction based on political ideology. Others have taken place based on 
distinctions between different religious ideologies; for example, in the former Yugoslavia; on ethnic 
or tribal distinctions, as in Rwanda; more recently, they have been institutionalized on the basis of a 
mixture of clan, religious and political distinctions in the Middle East, overlain by gender 
discrimination in which males are killed and younger women seized for sexual purposes. In many 
cases, such as Nazi Germany, Northern Ireland and the Middle East, the categorical distinctions are 
historically institutionalized. In the Kampuchean case, the categorical distinctions were freshly 
minted by the leadership and had no root in a deeply embedded sense of historic grievance.  
The genocide process is saturated with leadership. Leaders invoke a vision of a world purged 
of impurity using categorizations that distinguish different courses of treatment for different types of 
people. Typically, leaders seek to invoke a vision based on belief in an overwhelmingly teleological 
purpose, often historically justified by reference to the site of specific schisms, battles and 
grievances. To implement the vision followers need to be mobilized; hence, genocide is a complex 
and ongoing activity, rather than an irrational explosion of violence. Where there is no historical 
foundation in schism, battles, ethnicity, religion or language, then considerable leadership work is 
required to institutionalize the necessity of killing the stigmatized. Given the complexity of the 
process, analysis of the leadership component involved in novel founding, leading and organizing 
genocide seems necessary. Nonetheless, the organization and management studies community, with 
limited exceptions, has been mostly silent about the tragedy of genocidal leadership under 
circumstances of either historical or contemporary institutionalization (Stokes & Gabriel, 2010).  
Such a silence is odd, for, as several authors have suggested (Burnette, Pollack & Forsyth, 2011; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006), a great deal can be learned from “extreme cases”.  
Pol Pot’s regime is an extreme “extreme case” and in this article the leadership aspects 
involved in the Cambodian genocide are the topic for analysis. The paper starts with a 
methodological note and then organizes the discussion in a narrative sequence comprising two major 
parts. First, it discusses how genocidal leadership emerges. It asks: what are the conditions that turn 
terror into political possibility? Second, it focuses on the practice of genocidal leadership once power 
relations are established to implement its rule more widely. It asks: how do leaders accomplish evil? 
The paper indicates what needs to be considered in terms of anticipating the potential of evil 
contained in leadership action on the assumption that any partial explanation for the emergence of 
genocidal leadership is best built from paradigmatically extreme cases.  
Methodological Note 
The case of Cambodia in the Khmer Rouge period presents a historically embedded case study 
with extreme traits (Flyvbjerg, 2006), rendering characteristics of the genocidal process highly 
transparent. A combination of data collection methods was used to explore inductively the 
emergence of genocidal leadership in Cambodia, a country that had not suffered from internal 
division so much as from overbearing neighbors and conquerors. The present article is based on the 
analysis of a diversity of data sources, in order to obtain a balanced and multi-perspectival account of 
process, including historical analyses, memoirs, and testimonials. The analysis of data proceeds in 
two stages. In stage 1, the process of institutionalization of leadership is bracketed into two key 
periods: emergence and rule. In step 2, the major dimensions characterizing these periods are 
subsequently analyzed in order to extract information about how evil leadership emerges.  These two 
periods are examined after a brief overview of Pol Pot’s Cambodia, which sets the context for the 
case.    
Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge: An Overview  
The Khmer Rouge, a Maoist-inspired politico-military movement, was the final victor in a civil war 
that erupted in the geopolitically unstable region of Southeast Asia in the 1970s. Cambodia was 
caught in the political vortex of the Vietnam War, where the realpolitik of the major powers, namely 
China, US, and the USSR fought for supremacy. During the Vietnam War, the United States Air 
Force (USAF) dropped 2,756,941 tons of ordinances on Cambodian territory in an attempt to disrupt 
Viet Cong supply lines – making Cambodia probably the most heavily bombed country in history 
(Owen & Kiernan, 2006). As a result of the bombings, 600,000 Cambodians perished. The Khmer 
Rouge, in the context of this destruction, mobilized support from the peasant segments of the 
Cambodian population. Against the backdrop of devastation (a map of the bombing is presented by 
Owen and Kiernan [2006]) and in a context of corruption, poverty, and institutional decay, the 
Khmer Rouge presented themselves as a political movement that could rebuild the nation through 
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revolutionary action. With Chinese and, initially, Vietnamese support, the Khmer Rouge seized 
Phnom Penh on April 1, 1975, after the fall of the government of Lon Nol, during the final days of 
American involvement in Vietnam.  
The Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer), the label created by Prince Sihanouk to describe the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), were led by a clique of French educated Cambodian 
intellectuals, familiar with Communist ideals. They sought to create a utopian autarchic society: a 
self-sufficient agrarian, egalitarian, anti-professional, anti-technology and primitive communist 
paradise unlike any other actually existing society on the planet (Kiernan, 2008). As Mohr (2013) 
explains the process, the leadership presented a moral façade cast in the light of revolutionary zeal to 
the impoverished masses. The revolutionary process the Khmer Rouge unleashed engaged the nation 
in a vicious circle of radicalism never before witnessed: even the Maoist Chinese, in the latter stages 
of the Cultural Revolution, came to represent the Kampuchean project as excessively radical. 
To implement the Kampuchean revolution, the pillars of the old world were erased in order to 
institutionalize a utopian vision of a collectivist future. Families were disbanded. Meals were turned 
into communal events. Buddhism was forbidden. Political cells replaced community villages 
organized around collective work projects imposed top-down by Ângkar, the panoptical 
Organization. Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was, in summary, intended to be a classless society 
dominated by those designated by the Khmer Rouge as the “old people”, the peasants. Money would 
cease to circulate, markets would not exist and educational activities were to be replaced by political 
indoctrination. “Political incorrectness”, in whatever forms, would be eradicated and the politically 
correct DK line was established everywhere for everything. The new Kampuchea would be a wholly 
new form of social organization (Kiernan, 2008). 
Genocidal leadership: Emergence (1970-1974)  
While evil forms of leadership can be perceived as a form of projection by an innately evil person, 
such a representation would almost certainly be an oversimplification of reality. Undoubtedly, there 
is an element of individual projection but evil leadership also entails complex institutional processes 
of which leaders are only a part. In the case of the Khmer Rouge, three elements played critical roles 
in the ascension to power: attraction, resistance born of shared hardship, and alliance.                
ATTRACTION 
Attraction can be a result of either push or pull factors: some things push attractors together while 
others pull them together. In the Khmer case, the push factors were associated with corrupt 
government and the American bombings, while the pull factor was Khmer Rouge ideology. The 
Khmer Rouge movement was the most active oppositional force against the corrupt government and 
the American attacks. The Khmer Rouge leadership offered a vision and a viable alternative to 
powerlessness through opening a path for action that framed their actions in the terms of a new 
ideology, one aiming to create an entirely new society, one purged of injustice and lack of 
opportunities for the impoverished and immiserated peasantry. The appeal was not entirely 
ideological, as it fed on the resentments of those excluded from the small numbers of people that 
enjoyed a bourgeois life: the rebel army offered a practical livelihood for those with little in the way 
of resources. 
External push factors also played an important role in the emergence of the Khmer Rouge 
leadership. American bombings had a pivotal role in the history of the movement, pushing the 
peasantry towards the Khmer Rouge cause as one that was resolutely anti-American. The Khmer 
Rouge started their final ascent to power during the Vietnam War and the carpet-bombing of their 
territory. In domestic politics, the Khmer Rouge mobilized against the corrupt government of Lon 
Nol, who had declared the Kingdom of Cambodia a Republic in 1970. Lon Nol’s regime was 
characterized by authoritarian rule, corruption, violence, executions and disappearances. As Lon Nol 
sought to restore Cambodia's sovereignty in its eastern regions, where Vietnamese communists had 
established base camps and supply trails, the regime came to rely increasingly on large quantities of 
American aid, with the people caught between the viciousness of an increasingly erratic, weak and 
corrupt state and the ordinance of a lethal foreign power. Opposition to the USA and to Lon Nol 
fused. As the US Air Force attacked Laos and Cambodian areas in an attempt to destroy Vietnamese 
troops hiding in the jungle, it created an unexpected effect: habitat destruction led many people to 
flee and join the ranks of the Khmer Rouge. The push, avoiding the carpet-bombing, combined with 
the pull of the promise contained in the Khmer Rouge ideology of a land cleansed of a decadent and 
corrupt ruling class. 
RESISTANCE BORN OF SHARED HARDSHIP 
The Khmer Rouge was a jungle-based guerrilla movement. Life in the jungle was hard and 
precarious. The movement was clandestine and its members lived in the Cambodian jungles for 
years. In the clandestine phase, the movement started to stabilize and reproduce an ideology, a 
vision, work routines and other institutional processes. The development of oppression depends upon 
institutionalized work (see Martí & Fernandez, 2013). The experience of hardship and resistance 
molded the membership and was used to imprint the youthful members with the idea that their 
mission would put an end to an era of generalized injustice and oppression. As a measure of the 
hardships, one young Khmer Rouge soldier recalls, “In Ta Khmau, comrades ate even cockroaches 
to survive” (Ea & Sorya, 2001, p. 19). Surviving these hardships transformed the movement into an 
important political presence in a period when the institutional landscape in Cambodia was imploding. 
The Khmer Rouge emerged as the major opposition group to General Lon Nol’s government, 
shifting from being a relatively minor contender into the most consistent political alternative to the 
regime. Persistence in face of a very hostile environment was critical in the rise to power. While the 
management and organizational literatures tend to explain success through strategic factors, such as 
capabilities, resources and contextual structure, the case shows that strategy is not enough: 
persistence may be a form of strategic validation. If one group survives where all others fail, then it 
must have some strength that others lack. Endurance came first; strategy was second.                           
ALLIANCES 
The Khmer Rouge was initially a small player in Cambodian politics. Its ascent resulted from a 
combination of ideological fervor meeting unpredictable contingencies, led by the “Upper Brothers”, 
(as the Khmer Rouge designated the leadership). The contingencies were the corruption of the Lol 
Non regime and its urban bourgeois associations, together with the intense USAF bombing. These 
factors would have been insufficient without alliance building. The Khmer Rouge initially secured 
support from Vietnam via the Communist Party of Indochina. Later, consumed by historical distrust 
between Cambodia and Vietnam, the alliance broke and the Chinese became the Khmer Rouge’s 
main supporters. Chinese backing was critical to a geopolitical conflict involving the major world 
powers (the Soviets aligned with North Vietnam, and the US backed South Vietnam).  
It is difficult to explain evil leadership as the result of the malignity of one leader. Pol Potism 
was much bigger and much deeper than Pol Pot, the individual. Ben Kiernan, founding director of 
Yale’s Cambodian Genocide Program, explains that Pol Pot returned from China in 1970 in order to 
command preparations for full-scale revolt (Kiernan, 2004). To some extent, Pol Pot was an outcome 
of contingent circumstance, a pawn in the game of history being made by other leaders in several 
parts of the world: (a) Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in the United States, trying to stop 
“dominoes” of East Asia from falling into communist hands; (b) the nationalist struggle with 
socialist characters of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam; (c) the Gang of Four and Mao in China, with the 
Cultural Revolution. Proximity to the Chinese communists was crucial. Even after the fall of Phnom 
Pen to the Vietnamese invaders in January 1979, a core group led by Pol Pot found refuge in the 
Thai-Cambodia border, making occasional visits to China. Particularly influenced by the continuous 
struggle and permanent revolutionary philosophy of Maoism, with its valorization of the peasantry 
and class war on the bourgeoisie, the Khmer Rouge regime was not an ideological outlier but a 
variant of Southeast Asian communism 
Genocidal leadership: Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) 
Once in power, the Khmer Rouge founded their rule around three pillars: a utopian vision, the 
creation of a totalitarian space aligned with the vision, and the abundant use of terror to enforce the 
vision. These three processes are explained next.       
UTOPIA/DYSTOPIA 
The egalitarian paradise envisaged in the jungle, which justified the hardship and struggle, formed 
the central ideology of the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge utopia was to be one in which the evils 
and miseries of feudal expropriation of the land and exploitation of the peasantry, supported by a 
venal urban elite, would be substituted by peace, harmony and happiness, via the subordination of all 
traces of bourgeois individualism to the collective will. The Khmer Rouge and its following of 
Cambodians were drawn largely from rural areas (those who were categorized as “base” people, in 
opposition to the urban and “inferior” new people) and comprised a collective characterized by a 
deep sense of the humiliation inflicted on them by the recent Cambodian state and its bourgeois 
society that both fed into and was exacerbated by Khmer Rouge ideological training. Their vision 
promised a solution, a “cure” for their state and society’s ills. The cure was drastic: to re-educate the 
class enemies that oppressed them through living as the peasants did so that they shared the common 
people’s conditions, or through their elimination by legal process. It was assumed that the 
consequences of re-education and legal elimination would “eradicate” the problem of bourgeois 
domination. DK thus sought to found a utopia whose foundations rested upon an ideology of purity. 
It was meant to create “The cleanest, most fair society ever known in our history” (Hinton, 2005, p. 
8). In the case of DK, utopia rapidly revealed its dystopian face, creating a society describable as a 
prison without walls, an extreme totalitarian state, whose contours are explained next.          
TOTALITARIANISM 
The agrarian paradise promised by the leadership of the CPK amounted to little more than a gigantic 
slavery state for many of its inhabitants. The Khmer Rouge led their country, renamed Democratic 
Kampuchea, into a new dark ages. Under their rule, citizens were turned into instruments of the state. 
Private life disappeared in the new system as every sphere of life was brought under regulation by 
the state: as Rithy Panh (2013) put it, the state’s gaze roamed from the cooperative to the bedroom. 
As a result, people could only live under the big black tunic of the Ângkar, “The Organization”, 
under a state of exception justified by the prevalence of enemies (Cunha, Clegg, Rego, & Lancione, 
2012). There was no freedom of choice. The distinctive trait of a total institutional space is its claim 
over every aspect of the lives of those on the inside, those whom it contains, in every sense of the 
word. In DK, lives were determined by the Ângkar. “The Organization” decided who deserved to 
live, who should be marrying whom, even the micro-detail of where and how they should eat or 
sleep together as the state sought to regulate the sex lives of couples. The private became public as 
nothing could escape the ever-vigilant eyes of the pineapple, the metaphor used to refer to the 
multiple capacities for panopticism of the Ângkar, through its networks of informers and surveillance 
(Clegg, Cunha, & Rego, 2012). In such a context, informers bred victims in a spiral of increasing 
paranoia.         
TERROR 
The exercise of power inevitably contains a potential for coercion that should not be ignored (Weber, 
1978). Sometimes, leaders use extreme coercion as a power tool. In the case of DK, leaders used 
terror as a governmental tool abundantly. The country became a “dictatorship by terror” in which 
“death was everywhere” (Panh, 2013, pp. 110 and 194). States have traditionally been defined by 
their claims to having a monopoly of violence, a prerogative that the Kampuchean state used without 
hesitation. Violence was used against those who expressed any signs of misalignment with the status 
quo. The perfection of utopia admitted no doubt. Presumed enemies of the revolution were potential 
targets, with the Ângkar not resting in its search for enemies, many of them even inside the ranks: as 
the cadres put it, it was equally important to fight the enemy in the battlefields as well as in the rice 
fields (Ea, 2005). The rule of terror resulted in a regime imposed by brute force. Brutality was 
applied with no parsimony and no hesitation: as the regime defended itself, the policy was that it was 
better to risk killing the innocent rather than letting the guilty escape.   
Violence was a necessary tool to implement the utopian vision. In the initial phases, hard 
measures were viewed as necessary to eradicate the old habits and to remove the hordes of enemies 
of the revolution. Power relations between the base people and the hated class enemies were founded 
on revenge fuelled by the imposition of hardship for the fortunate, who might learn through re-
education. Hard, brutal violence was reserved for all others whose class origins were too impure or 
who were suspected of being counter-revolutionaries or spies acting against the interests of the 
comrades.  
Implementing utopia became an extreme experiment in leadership by terror (Kets de Vries, 
2004). Terror, once unleashed, became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The regime fought to exterminate 
all forms of dissent and created a chain of terror (Ea, 2005) that extended all over the country, 
organizing a network of prisons that articulated with death camps, the well-known “killing fields”. 
At the center of such a network was the infamous S-21 prison of Phnom Penh, where some 17,000 
people, namely the top cadres who had fallen into disgrace in the eyes of the senior echelons of the 
movement, were tortured and later executed at the Choueng Ek killing field.  
Implications for the Study of Evil Leadership 
What does the case of DK teach about the nature of evil leadership? From the above discussion, a 
number of lessons can be derived. A first lesson refers to the role of the top leader. The process was 
directed by a group of leaders (the so-called Upper Brothers) rather than by a charismatic, visionary 
leader. It would be a mistake to assume that Pol Pot was a charismatic revolutionary hero. Pol Pot 
was initially described as a mediocre student and as a “self-effacing” man (Short, 2004). In reality, in 
the initial period of the Khmer Rouge rule, he was not even known to the people. As suggested 
elsewhere, the leader could be seen as an instrument of history (Cunha, Rego, & Clegg, 2011). 
Genocidal leadership resulted from the institutional action of a group of co-leaders (the Upper 
Brothers) rather than from the charismatic powers of one malign person. Once the process was 
underway Pol Pot emerged as a shadowy leader, rarely seen. Thus, there is a marked contrast with 
studies of charismatic leaders, such as Hitler. As Kershaw (2000) explains, the ascension of Hitler’s 
German National Socialist Workers’ Party is difficult to understand without fully considering the 
charisma and the rhetorical appeal of the Fuhrer to the masses. In the Nazi case, as charismatic 
leadership theory predicts (Klein & House, 1995), the leader is a necessary presence in the leadership 
process. In Kampuchea, Pol Pot was no rabble-rousing charismatic figure but an almost invisible 
element to the masses. 
A second lesson is that, during times of massive upheaval and chaos in which extreme 
contingencies drive devaluation of existing recipes, people’s approval of radical ideas are stimulated. 
As radical ideas are advanced, their initial acceptance by a strongly ideologically coherent cohort – 
such as the comrades who emerged from the jungle – functions to allow the institutionalization of 
perverse relationships between the leader and the led in the absence of any other coherent or valued 
ideologies (Klein & House, 1995). The utopian world of the Khmer Rouge became viable because 
the status quo presented itself in the form of very unenviable alternatives: (a) in the cities, the 
corrupted government of Lon Nol, which had removed Prince Sihanouk, destroying the traditional 
legitimacy associated in Cambodia with the royalty; (b) in the countryside, the war zones that had 
imported destruction from a foreign war and wreaked destruction on peasant agrarianism. In extreme 
cases, the exclusion of past choice creates a void that radicalism can colonize.  
In a third lesson, visionaries can become captives of their rhetoric, their utopias, those ideas 
that they cherish, so defining of their identity that their leadership becomes an exercise in power that 
preserves the vision against all contingencies. Under such circumstances, being part of a permanently 
failing ideological program, because of the existence of opponents to it, becomes the best incentive 
to apply even more of what is failing so that if the vision is not being realized, the project requires 
the faithful to prove their faith by pushing it harder: more enemies must be found and annihilated. 
Power relations must be used to do whatever it takes to make the ideological vision become true. The 
leadership and management literatures tend to emphasize the positive side of vision but there is a 
dark side. Visions are often more appealing if they favor a clear contrast with what is and dispense 
contempt for the status quo. Visions can become inflammable ideological material. Being aware of 
the dangers associated with the promotion of vision is thus necessary in leadership studies. Leaders 
might actually mean what they say – as the case of Kampuchea indicates – and do whatever it takes 
to transform vision into reality, be it in Kampuchean Cambodia or some other part of the world. 
Leaders who strive hard to stay on message are inflexible in being able to refocus when reality 
confounds their vision: for such commitments it is better to reshape reality without refocusing the 
vision.                                                      
Fourth, once leaders achieve power, their utopias may degenerate into dystopias. Positive talk 
means little. In Nazi Germany, Hitler was preparing for war while talking about peace (Kershaw, 
2000). In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge army were simultaneously rebelling against injustice and 
clearing the path to a genocidal state. Utopia is most often a stepping-stone to dystopia.            
Fifth, words count. As discussed, good words are not indicators of good deeds. Good talk is 
cheap and should be received with caution. Some keywords should be viewed as warning signs or 
exemplars of what Martí and Fernández (2013) called a “camouflage language”, the use of 
euphemisms that hide and soften the intentions behind them. Pol Pot told a Belgian delegation that 
“We do not have prisons and we do not even use the word prison. Bad elements are sent to farming 
production” (Ea, 2005, p. 12). These farms were more akin to slaughter stockades. Two categories of 
words are especially relevant: (1) those that emphasize the purity of one’s in-group, and (2) those 
that underline the impurity of the out-group. These language imbalances were used abundantly in 
DK. The peasantry were pure whereas the city dwellers, the new people, were impure. The latter 
were then marginalized, animalized and targeted by the former. The stereotyping offered explanation 
and lent “legitimacy” to inhumanity. Evil leaders use language categorization devices to create the 
binaries of friends and enemies, compatriots and competitors, and those “with us” or “against us” in 
precise ways. Learning to detect the language of evil is necessary to break the vicious circle of evil 
leadership. 
Sixth, it may be difficult to learn from the evils of even the recent past. School history 
textbooks in Cambodia refer only minimally to the Khmer Rouge era. While the 2013 Cambodian 
election was positive, it was also demonstrative of a fragile state. On the one hand, a democratic 
election is something to be celebrated per se. But on the other hand, the campaign’s verbal 
exchanges suggested that it may be difficult to learn from the evils of the past. One opposition 
candidate remarked that the Kampuchean genocide was actually a fabrication of the Vietnamese, 
rather than an historical fact. The target of the accusation was Hun Sen, the country’s strongman 
Prime Minister since 1985, who found refuge in Vietnam during the Khmer Rouge ascendancy 
(Mehta & Mehta, 2013). Hun Sen was positioned in the narrative as owing allegiance to the enemy 
Vietnam In anticipated response of his winning, the possibility of a new version of a tyrant regime, a 
reincarnation of the Khmer Rouge, was advanced as likely if the election delivered the “wrong” 
results. The heat of political battles is a fertile soil for verbal excess. Leadership that forgets the past 
or rewrites it contributes to building “historiographical perversions” (Nichanian, 2009). Considering 
such a risk, how can one develop contra-strategies?                                       
Implications: How to Counter the Institutionalization of Evil? 
Considering the persistence of genocide throughout the ages (Goldhagen, 2009; Volhardt & 
Bilewicz, 2013), there is no reason to be excessively optimistic about potential remedies but such 
realistic observation should not be a source of discouragement. As Karl Popper argued “Not only do 
I hate violence, but I firmly believe that the fight against it is not at all hopeless” (Popper, 1986, p. 
3). Humanity has, according to some research, been able to improve its own nature (Pinker, 2011) or 
at least to use civilization as a process of self-control (Elias, 1982), a finding that suggests that 
efforts to theorize counter violence is relevant not only on moral but also on practical grounds 
(Baron-Cohen, 2012). How can the case contribute to the understanding and neutralization of the 
institutional processes of evil leadership (see table 1 for a summary)?               
First, the case suggests that non-charismatic leaders can be at the core of the process of evil 
leadership, not just charismatic demagogues. Pol Pot, the self-effacing man, led the genocidal state 
not as a mass manipulator but rather as the central occupant of a network that empowered its 
representatives to achieve brutalities of several sorts. People who embodied the Ângkar’s authority 
acted on the basis of their mutually agreed license to kill rather than on some emotional resonance 
coming from the leader. The lack of a charismatic representative should not be taken as an indicator 
that the process will fail due to the lack of the metaphorical leadership “spark” (Klein & House, 
1995). The power to enforce the vision is distributed throughout the system and the led are often 
active or passive supporters of an evil vision (Kellerman, 2004; Volhardt & Bilewicz, 2013). As the 
case suggests, collective radicalism can be exacerbated by radical ideas rather than by radical 
leaders: radical ideas can propagate even without charismatic leaders in a context in which evil is 
more circular and institutionally distributed than it is concentrated in a malign leader (Cunha, Rego 
& Clegg, 2010).                            
Second, when, in opposition to other radical ideas and contexts, radical ideas flourish, they can 
be perceived as acceptable options amongst the polyphony on offer. It took an invading army to 
dislodge the Khmer Rouge. In less martial and more civil circumstances, when leaders lead by 
exclusion, they instigate the radicalization of those excluded who have nothing to lose.  To counter 
evil and exclusionary leadership, short of invasion from outside, organizations need to develop 
appreciation for tempered radicalism (Meyerson & Scully, 1995). Often this will entail the dramatic 
overthrow of a hated leader, whether by popular revolt, coup d’état, or invasion. In more 
organizationally ‘normal’ terms we might think of these as industrial action, a board coup, or a 
takeover. Tempered radicalism means giving voice and being inclusive. Developing a counter to the 
institutionalization of evil leadership thus means leading by inclusion, offering space for dissent, 
attacking inequality and exclusion, increasing the leader’s legitimacy and effective power (Tyler, 
2006) by building legitimacy rooted in popular support. 
Third, utopian ideas are both powerful and dangerous. Without checks, balances and limits on 
power’s concentration, the unfolding of utopian processes by those who assume power is not easily 
countered, especially where “power grows out of the barrel of a gun”, to recall one of Chairman 
Mao’s famous phrases. Kampuchean history shows that utopian ideals rapidly turned into practical 
dystopia. People in Phnom Penh quickly realized that something strange was happening on the way 
to utopia, when the Khmer Rouge seized the capital. As Rithy Panh explains (Panh, 2013, p. 28): 
“Many books declare that Phnom Penh joyously celebrated the arrival of the revolutionaries. I recall 
instead feverishness, disquiet, a sort of anguished fear of the unknown. And I don’t remember any 
scenes of fraternization. What surprised us was that the revolutionaries didn’t smile. They kept us at a 
distance, coldly. I quickly noticed the looks in their eyes, their clenched jaws, their fingers on their 
triggers. I was frightened by that first encounter, by the entire absence of feeling.”       
Fourth, there are institutional alternatives to utopian change: incrementalism changes things by 
trial and error. It assumes that all solutions are potentially fallible and their espousal requires 
humility and moderation rather than hubris and contempt. Popper formulated such tension in terms 
of the opposition of revisable plans and utopian blueprints. Institutional incrementalism offers a way 
forward for positive social change. Incrementalists reject untested master plans, grandiose visions, 
and infallible Führers. They instead defend a “satisficing” conception of organizational change 
where strategic intentions, realistic visions and limited leaders proceed through small, iterative 
moves (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963). Whereas incrementalism favors competition between 
alternatives and a trial-and-error approach to social change, utopia refers to the exclusion of 
alternatives. Utopia reflects the aesthetics of perfection, whereas incrementalism appreciates the 
aesthetics of imperfection. Incrementalist solutions are more humane, allowing space for people to 
be more aware of their flaws and limitations. Utopian thinking, in turn, is more vulnerable to capture 
by the perfection of its grandiose creations and more able to deny their flaws and limits or the limited 
ability of the people charged with their delivery. Considering the above, evil in leadership resides in 
institutional intolerance of opposition, disregard for the weak, as well as the presence of contempt in 
the make-up of the emotional repertoires encouraged. 
Fifth: words are revealing. Special attention should thus be given to the presence of some 
specific keywords in a leadership discourse. References to the purity of some and the impurity of 
others, expressions that suggest the dehumanization or the creation of stereotyped visions of the out-
group, namely expressions that dehumanize members or make stereotypical representations, are all 
negative symptoms. These can go in parallel with the creation of expressions of collective narcissism 
on the part of the in-group. Evil intentions are transmitted and assisted by words that divide, 
dehumanize and diminish. A recent example is that of the Korean Central News Agency, a North 
Korean state media outlet, whose spokesperson for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of 
Korea, offered the following tirade to Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s president, calling her a “dirty 
comfort woman for the US and despicable prostitute selling off the nation”; The Economist, 2014, p. 
50). Finding toxic mots in a leader’s discourse reflects ideas circulating and opens windows on 
leadership thinking.                 
Sixth, a necessary obligation for leadership researchers is to reflect on tragic events, study bad 
leadership, and explain how people animalize the “Other” in ways that institutionalize genocidal 
behaviors. There is too much accentuation of the positive in the field, as Alvesson (1996) suggests. 
The present article supports previous calls for more attention being paid to misleaders and the 
histories they tell (Gini & Green, 2012; Mohr, 2013). As is frequently remarked, the risk of 
forgetting what one can learn from the past is that one might repeat its egregious errors yet again. 
Forgetfulness of a world gone wrong is not to be encouraged: leaders and leadership studies need to 
learn that learning from the negative is as important as learning from the positive. They also need to 
know that leadership is a broad field – it is not just a matter of traits or situational contingencies in 
empirical studies performed cross-sectionally, but a matter of learning from history and institutions – 
the grotesque as much as the glorious.  
Table 1 about here 
Conclusion 
Only to celebrate research recounting the positive in leadership is entirely explicable but extremely 
unbalanced. The current emphasis on a positive organizational scholarship should be balanced by 
attention to evil organization studies. Much more needs to be known about what makes for evil as 
well as for good. There are few worse cases than the systematic leadership of genocide, a 
phenomenon that constitutes a class of its own. Instead of ignoring genocide (Clegg, 2006), 
organizational researchers should thus strive to impede the propensity for some pasts to repeat 
themselves, in different places, with different victims but displaying the same traces of extreme 
human suffering. By doing so, the article has responded to calls for more discussion on evil 
leadership (Gini & Green, 2012; Mohr, 2013) as a form of tyranny, analyzing the case of Pol Pot and 
the DK regime as an extreme institutional setting for studying the process. The case offers some 
institutional indicators that facilitate the identification of potential evil in leadership: (a) a utopian 
vision for the future, (b) the exclusionary logic associated with the vision, (c) a moral façade, (d) the 
use of diminishing language to describe the excluded, categorization and separation activities, (e) the 
lack of institutional checks and balances, and (f) a lack of transparency about the leadership. All 
these elements were present in the Khmer Rouge regime (as they are, nowadays, in ISIS). The final 
conclusion is that the first of all evils resides in the attempts by some to impose their views on others 
of what happiness should mean for all, of what the real interest of the other are, even against their 
preferences (Clegg, 1989). Managing against evil is an exercise in human and organizational 
polyphony (Kornberger, Clegg, & Carter, 2006), positing the rights of plurality and dissent as the 
highest form of defense against totalitarian forms of harmony. 
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Appendix. Pol Pot and Pol Potism: Some Key Chronological Moments 
Years Saloth Sar alias Pol Pot and Cambodia 
1863-1953  French protectorate. 
1920s  Born in the French protectorate of Cambodia in 1925. 
1940’s  Arrives to Paris in September 1949. 
1950’s  1953: King (later prince) Sihanouk gains independence. 
 Sâr approaches the Communists in France. Meets members of the future dome of the DK 
regime. 
 Joins the French Communist Party in 1952. In 1953 returns to Phnom Penh and joins the 
ICP. 
 Starts career as teacher. 
 Marries Khieu Ponnary and works as communist militant in clandestinity. 
1960’s  A list of “Reds” is published by government in 1963. 
 Sâr and others flee to Eastern Cambodia. 
 Peasant revolt against Sihanouk. 
 Visits Hanoi. 
1970’s  Sâr reaches agreement with Sihanouk to fight the Lon Nol pro-American regime. 
 1970: Khmer Republic regime. 
 1970-1975: Civil war. 
 CPK forces gain combat experience. 
 In 1973 US bombs CPK positions, causing thousands of civilian casualties. 
 Lon Nol regime collapses and CPK takes Phnom Penh in 1974.  
 Purges start inside Cambodia and hostilities with Vietnam intensify in December 1978. 
 Phnom Penh falls to the Vietnamese in 1979. 
1980s  Hun Sen becomes prime minister. 
1990’s  US Congress signs Cambodian Genocide Justice act into law. 
 1993: Sihanouk returns to throne. 
 1998: Pol Pot’s death. 
 
Table 1 . Genocidal leadership: Sources, Signs, and Contra-measures 
Source Signs Contra-measures 
Misleadership processes A leader or a leadership team 
cultivates a vision with utopian 
traits.  
 Beware utopian blueprints. 
 Grow an appreciation for social polyphony 
(i.e. voice diversity and inclusion). 
 Cultivate incrementalist thinking.    
Screen contextual signs of 
radicalism 
Radical ideas circulate and gain 
followers. 
 Combat extreme radicalism via the genuine 
protection of moderation and inclusion. 
 Leaders should avoid “putting out fire with 
gasoline”    
Utopia as process Utopia is more than a utopian 
leader: utopia is a process 
contributed to by followers.    
 Introduce a system of checks and balances.  
 Limit the concentration of power. 
Lack of incrementalism Solutions for social problems are 
of the all or nothing type.  
 Facilitate experimental, small scale solutions. 
 Allow the diversity of experiments. 
 Appreciate incremental approaches to change.   
Search for keywords Some words are divisive and 
pejorative, creating a Manichean 
“us vs. them” world. 
 Consider official discourse. Does it include 
words that diminish the other party? Render 
the effects of discourse explicit. 
 Counter the use of divisive words and 
stereotypes.   
Learn from the past Attempts to rewrite the past or 
refute facts. 
 Revisit the past. 
 Counter collective amnesia.  
 Study past examples of genocidal leadership. 
 Consider the importance of “worst practices” 
in order to avoid them.     
 
 
 
 
